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FRAMEWORK FOR THE RECOGNITION OF COMPETITION
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND DILEMMAS FACED BY
COMPETITION AUTHORITIES
András Tóth*
Should competition authorities reward compliance? How
could competition authorities reward compliance? This article
aims to examine these questions by analysing the approaches
taken by the competition authorities, and the positive and negative effects that may result if competition authorities reward competition compliance programmes. Finally, the paper sets out the
frameworks of recognition of competition compliance programmes and dilemmas faced by competition agencies when rewarding ex-ante and ex-post compliance efforts.
I. INTRODUCTION
rom time to time the question arises whether competition authorities should take into account competition compliance programs.1 This Note discusses whether competition authorities
should reward ex-ante and/or ex-post competition compliance programs, and if so, how this could be achieved in practice.

F

* András Tóth PhD, Chairman of the Competition Council and Vicepresident of the Hungarian Competition Authority, associate professor at
Károli University, Budapest, Hungary. The views and opinions expressed
in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Hungarian Competition Authority. For correspondence: toth.andras@kre.hu.
1
See e.g. Anne Riley and Margaret Bloom, ‘Antitrust Compliance
Programmes – Can Companies and Antitrust Agencies Do More?’ (2011)
1 Competition Law Journal 21; Wouter P.J. Wils, ‘Antitrust compliance
programmes and optimal antitrust enforcement’ J. of Antitrust Enforcement (2013) 1 (1): 52-81; University of Florida Levin College of Law Research Paper No. 16-3; Damien Geradin, ‘Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply to Wouter Wils.’ J
Antitrust Enforcement (2013) 1 (2): 325-346; Anne Riley, Daniel Sokol,
‘Rethinking Compliance’ 3 J. of Antitrust Enforcement 31 (2015).
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Section II outlines the pros and cons of competition compliance rewards before examining the different approaches taken by
a number of competition authorities around the world. Section III
(based on the experiences of different competition authorities) sets
out the frameworks of recognition of competition compliance programs and dilemmas faced by competition agencies when rewarding ex-ante and ex-post compliance efforts. Finally, section IV contains the conclusion of this Note.
II. SHOULD COMPETITION AUTHORITIES REWARD COMPLIANCE?

A. Differentiating Between ex-ante and ex-post
Compliance Recognition
At this point it is necessary to distinguish between ex-ante
and ex-post recognition of competition compliance programs. Exante recognition of competition compliance refers to a situation in
which a competition compliance program was already implemented prior to the finding of a competition law infringement,
whereas ex-post recognition of competition compliance refers to a
situation in which a compliance program is either adopted or upgraded as a consequence of a competition law infringement.

B. Arguments in Favor of Rewarding Competition Compliance
Both companies and competition authorities have a vested
interest in the prevention of competition law infringements but
companies themselves are best positioned to prevent or detect such
infringements in the first instance.2 As a consequence, competition
authorities should take into account the opportunities presented by
the technological developments that have taken place in relation
to compliance, which enable companies to better prevent or detect
corporate infringements.
Another argument for promoting compliance is that it may
help to avoid and prevent competition law infringements, or if ongoing unlawful conduct is found to exist, it may help to reveal and
put an end to the conduct at an early stage.3 Some authors argue

2
3

Wils (n 1) 54.
Ibid 56.
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that compliance programs could enhance the effectiveness of leniency policies.4 It is argued that a company that is able to better
detect potential infringements internally is also in a better position
to report infringements to the competition authority before other
cartel members.56 Consequently, competition compliance programs may complement leniency in the detection of cartels.

C. Arguments Against Rewarding Competition Compliance
On the other hand, competition law compliance faces a
number of difficulties due to the fact that competition law norms
are formulated in a very abstract manner and competition law expectations are heavily developed by case law. Accordingly, competition law compliance requires a constant review of the developing
practices of the competition enforcers and the courts, thus making
competition law compliance more onerous.
The Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter
“CJEU”) highlighted some drawbacks of compliance programs in
the elevator cartel case. 7 According to the CJEU, the compliance
program in question made it even more difficult for the infringement to be uncovered as the employees of the company were under
threat of serious penalties and therefore tried to hide the infringement.8 Another argument against considering compliance programs as a mitigating factor is that this practice would discriminate against those small and medium-sized enterprises (hereinafter
“SMEs”) that do not have sufficient resources to develop compliance programs, and which would accordingly be unable to benefit
from this reward. Vice-President Almunia said in 2010, “[…]why
should I reward a compliance programme that has failed?”9 Later,
4

Florence Thépot, ‘Can Compliance Programmes Contribute to Effective Antitrust Enforcement?’ Forthcoming in J. Paha (ed.) ‘Competition Law Compliance Programs? An Interdisciplinary Approach’
Springer (2016). 5.
5
See ibid. 6. and Geradin (n 1) 328.
6
However Geradin states that compliance programmes only contribute to effective leniency programmes if they allow early detection of infringements. Geradin (n 1) 341.
7
Case T-138/07. Schindler Holding Ltd and Others v European Commission. ECLI:EU:T:2011:362.
8
Ibid. para 280.
9
Joaquin Almunia, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Competition Policy, ‘Compliance and Competition policy’
(Speech at Businesseurope & US Chamber of Commerce. Competition
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he added that “A successful compliance programme brings its own
reward. The main reward for a successful compliance programme
is not getting involved in unlawful behaviour. Instead, a company
involved in a cartel should not expect a reward from us for setting
up a compliance programme, because that would be a failed programme by definition.”10

D. Approaches Adopted by a Number of Competition Authorities
In the 1980s and ‘90s the Commission of the European Union (hereinafter “Commission”) took into account compliance programs as a mitigating or aggravating factor.11 By the 2000s, the
Commission’s approach had changed and it began to take a neutral position concerning compliance programs, with the result that
the adoption of a compliance program was now considered as neither an aggravating factor, nor a mitigating factor, in terms of
fines.12 This paradigm shift was also confirmed by the CJEU.13
Some competition authorities have adopted slightly different approaches to that of the Commission and have adopted fining
systems that reflect the benefits presented by operating compliance
programs.
On February 10, 2012, the French Competition Authority
(hereinafter “Autorité”) issued a framework document regarding
competition compliance programs.14 According to the Autorité, the
conference, in Brussels, 25 October 2010) available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-586_en.htm> accessed 09 November 2017.
10
Joaquin Almunia, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Competition Policy, ‘Cartels: the priority in competition enforcement.’ (Speech at the 15th International Conference on Competition:
A Spotlight on Cartel Prosecution. Berlin, 14 April 2011) available at
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11268_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 09 November 2017.
11
Napier Brown - British Sugar (Case No IV/30.178) Commission Decision 88/518/EEC [1988] OJ L 284/41 para 85.
12
Simone Pieri, Jacques Moscianese and Irene de Angelis, ‘In-house
Compliance of EU Competition Rules in Practice.’ 5 Journal of European
Competition Law & Practice (2013) 71.
13
Joined cases T-101/05 and T-111/05 BASF AG (T-101/05) and UCB
SA (T-111/05) v Commission of the European Communities [2007]
ECLI:EU:T:2007:380, para 52.
14
Autorité de la concurrence, ‘Framework-Document of 10 February
2012 on Antitrust Compliance Programmes’ available at
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mere existence of a compliance program should not in itself result
in the reduction of a fine, and a compliance program should not
per se be considered as a mitigating factor. However, if it turns out
that high ranked managers or other corporate personnel have participated in a competition law infringement, this cannot be taken
into account as an aggravating factor, despite the fact that the company’s officials were obligated to comply with all of the compliance
rules of the organization. The only factor that can be taken into
account as a mitigating circumstance is if a company can prove
with objective and verifiable evidence that it had ceased, on its
own initiative, the violation before the competition authority became aware of the conduct.15 In addition, if a company decides to
settle and offers to implement a compliance program or to
strengthen an existing one, the Autorité will grant an additional
10% fine reduction.
The main objective of the Competition and Markets Authority’s (hereinafter “CMA”) policy with regard to compliance
programs is to encourage companies to prevent infringements by
adopting robust compliance programs. The CMA’s (and its predecessor’s, Office of Fair Trading’s) guidance on penalties16 highlights that there is no automatic fine reduction. A fine may be increased where a compliance program has been used to facilitate an
infringement or to mislead the CMA. Nonetheless, the CMA will
assess whether the steps taken by the undertaking were adequate
enough to merit a 10% fine reduction. The guidance emphasizes
that the mere existence of a compliance program cannot be considered as a mitigating factor. However, if a company can prove, that
proper steps have been taken to achieve a clear and unambiguous
commitment to competition law compliance in the form of
measures taken to identify, assess, and mitigate risks, then such
measures will probably be treated as a mitigating factor.17
Italy has adopted an ex-post regime. The Autoritá Garante
della Concorrenza e del Mercato (hereinafter “AGCM”) may grant
a fine reduction of up to 15% if the company in question undertakes to set up a compliance program or to improve an existing
<https://goo.gl/Gw0S6v> accessed 09 November 2017
15
Ibid.
16
Office of Fair Trading, ‘OFT’s guidance as to the appropriate
amount of penalty.’ [2012] OFT423. available at <https://goo.gl/J3GRiO>
accessed 09 November 2017.
17
Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (8th Edition
edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 438
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program. The company’s compliance program must involve the
top management, include measures aimed at identifying risks and
provide for incentives, sanctions, adequate training programs, an
audit, and a follow-up mechanism to ensure compliance with the
program.18 The recent decision of the AGCM highlights the importance of implementing effective compliance programs in order
to benefit from a mitigation of the fine.19 The United States has
adopted an ex-ante regime with the result that only genuine compliance efforts will be taken into consideration when calculating
the fines to be imposed on companies. According to Brent Snyder,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, “[o]nly compliance efforts that
go further, that reflect in some way genuine efforts to change a
company’s culture, will receive consideration in calculating a company’s fine.”20
Under the Brazilian Competition Commission’s guidelines
issued in 2016 on competition compliance programs, a company
which has sought to implement a “robust” compliance program
(comprising of proportionate and good faith measures) is eligible
for a penalty reduction in the event of a competition law violation.21
III. FRAMEWORK OF THE RECOGNITION OF COMPLIANCE
EFFORTS AND DILEMMAS FACED BY A COMPETITION AGENCY
18

Pieri and others (n 12) 7.
Veronica Pinotti, ’Compliance Programs – The Italian Competition
Authority Highlights the Importance of an Effective Implementation and
Update’ available at <http://www.antitrustalert.com/2017/01/articles/italian-developments/compliance-programs-the-italian-competition-authority-highlights-the-importance-of-an-effective-implementation-and-update/> accessed 09 November 2017.
20
The DOJ granted fine reductions in two plea agreements due to the
implementation of effective compliance programmes going forward after
the infringements. Brent Snyder, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
‘Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brent Snyder Delivers Remarks’
(Speech at the Sixth Annual Chicago Forum on International Antitrust,
Chicago,
June
8,
2015)
available
at
<https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-assistant-attorney-generalbrent-snyder-delivers-remarks-sixth-annual-chicago> accessed 09 November 2017.
21
Conselho Administrativo de Defese Economica (CADE), 'CADE
publishes the English version for the Compliance Guidelines' (CADE's official website, 18 February 2016) available at <http://en.cade.gov.br/pressreleases/cade-publishes-the-english-version-for-the-compliance-guidelines > accessed 09 November 2017
19
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After providing an overview of the approaches taken by
different jurisdictions, it can be concluded that the mere adoption
of a compliance program should not in itself lead to immunity or
the total reduction of fines in any case, as this would allow companies to maximize the profits and benefits stemming from illegal
conducts, and thus competition compliance would become a
“cheap insurance policy against competition liability.”22
An automatic fine reduction in the case of compliance programs that existed prior to the finding of an infringement may incentivize companies to implement ‘cosmetic’ compliance programs.23 Based on international experiences, only genuine
compliance efforts should be recognized, which means that a company must be able to demonstrate how its competition compliance
regime resulted in the detection and termination of the infringement and the discovery of new or added value evidence in the case
in question. If this is the case, authorities may further reduce a fine
by an extra 5-10%.
On the other hand, automatic ex-post recognition of compliance may undermine the adoption of compliance programs,
which could prevent or detect illegal activities before any actual
infringements are committed. However, ex-post recognition of
compliance can be used to improve the attractiveness of cooperation and/or administrative burden saving procedures such as settlement or non-full immunity leniency. A fine can be reduced by a
few (up to a maximum of five) percent in the case of a company
that adopts or upgrades an existing compliance program to ensure
effective competition compliance for the future in a settlement
and/or leniency application for a fine reduction, or if the company
has compensated the damages caused by its infringement during
the procedure. The granting of a reduction of a fine in the case of
ex-post compliance could be made conditional on the compliance
program in question meeting an established international minimum standard, the use of innovative solutions (e.g. applying modern technologies), a guarantee that the program is viable, etc.
The recognition of compliance may raise the question of
whether such recognition can only be positive. I am confident that
if a company deliberately breaches its compliance program, which
it adopted in a previous competition procedure, then this can be
regarded as an aggravating circumstance. However, there are a
22
23

Wils (n 1) 70.
Ibid
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number of grey areas, for example, concerning what can be regarded as a deliberate breach, or what a competition authority
should do when it learns that an ex-ante compliance program has
also been used to hide a competition infringement. For instance, if
a competition authority is in possession of evidence that a compliance program was effective and the responsible officers of the company knew of the infringement but did not stop it or report it to the
competent authority, should the company be required to report the
wrongdoing identified as a result of the effective compliance program, or it is enough if the company brings the infringement to an
end based upon the internal compliance alert?
The informant reward mechanism also raises important
questions. Based on experience, informants normally do not provide high-quality, first-hand evidence and therefore a very limited
percentage of informant applications are sufficient to trigger a cartel investigation.24 Consequently, it is desirable if a potential informant who is subject to a company’s compliance program first
reports his/her finding to the competent compliance officer(s), unless such an informant would suffer adverse consequences as a result. Furthermore, it is also important that the company in question has sufficient resources to collect and submit evidence
according to the competition authority’s needs. If this is not the
case then it is preferable that potential informants have a direct
line of communication to the competent competition authority,
provided that companies may be tempted to hide infringements reported to them by informants from the authority.
Finally, compliance programs as a mitigating factor would
discriminate against those SMEs that do not have sufficient resources to develop compliance programs. It is important that consideration is given to how we can ensure that ex-post and ex-ante
considerations of compliance programs do not discriminate against
SMEs.

24

András Tóth, The Use of Leniency Policy in Cartel Cases (Speech
at the Taiwan International Conference on Competition Policy/Law Strategies of Competition Policy in the Global and Digital Economy, Fair
Trade Commission. Taipei, Taiwan, June 28 – 29, 2016).
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IV. CONCLUSION
It may be assumed that there are additional reasons for rewarding competition compliance programs based on international
experiences, but a number of questions still need to be answered.
It is evident that rewarding compliance programs is beneficial for leniency programs, as the reward may accelerate the competition between the potential cartelist applicants to report the infringements to the competent authorities at an earlier stage.
Competition authorities should also not ignore technological developments, since technological developments enable companies to
more effectively detect infringements. This is in the public interest
as companies continue to be in the best position to detect infringements. While it is clear that granting total immunity from fines for
a compliance program is not desirable, automatic benefits should
also not be granted for compliance. Additionally, cosmetic compliance programs should not be rewarded, but care must be taken to
ensure that ex-post compliance remedies do not incentivize companies to prefer ex-post compliance programs in place of ex-ante
programs, since it is the ex-ante programs that can truly contribute
to the detection of unlawful activities. It also seems to be apparent
that ex-ante programs should exclusively be rewarded if a company provides new evidence to the competition authority in the
framework of a leniency application for fine reduction and the
company can prove that the submitted evidence stems from the
effective operation of its compliance program. Consequently, exante recognition of competition compliance can be used to further
increase leniency or other forms of cooperation through the provision of a higher reward. However, some questions still remain unanswered (e.g. concerning the relationship between the informant
reward scheme and the companies’ compliance programs) and relating to deliberate breaches of compliance programs as an aggravating circumstance.

